Pro Properties, Contra Generalized Kinds by Van Geenhoven, Veerle
Pro Properties, C ontra Generalized Kinds 
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In Carlson ( 1 977) , English bare plurals are treated as unambiguously kind-denoting 
expressions . For example, although in ( 1 )  horses receives a quasi-universal 
interpretation, Carlson argues that this bare plural denotes a kind. And although in 
(2) horses receives an existential interpretation, this bare plural is said to denote a 
kind as well. 
( 1 )  Horses are shy. 
(2) Horses were galloping in the meadow. 
People have criticized Carlson's proposal for a number of reasons, most of which 
are summarized in Krifk:a et al. ( 1 995). One of the objections is that English bare 
plurals have indefInite interpretations. In (3), we see that the bare plural horses can 
occur as the argument of the existential predicate . (4) shows that the singular 
indefmite a horse can occur in such a context as well. However, other expressions 
which can denote a kind, such as the NP the horse in (5) , cannot be the argument of 
the existential predicate. This is shown in (6) . On Carlson 's theory, we would 
expect that kind-denoting expressions have the same distribution. 
(3) There are horses stampeding through the gate. 
(4) There is a horse stampeding through the gate. 
(5) The horse is a mammal. 
(6) * There is the horse stampeding through the gate. 
Building on this observation and on McNally 's ( 1 992) view that the argument of 
the existential predicate is a property, I proposed in Van Geenhoven ( 1 998) that 
narrow scope indefinites or, in general, weak nominals are property-denoting 
expressions. Thus, on their narrow scope reading a horse in (7) and horses in (8) 
denote properties. 
(7) Sam didn�t buy a borse. 
i .  "It is hot the case that Sam bought any horse." 
ii. "There was a horse such that Sam did not buy it." 
« s,<e,t» ) 
(8) Sam didn' t  buy horses. 
i .  "It is not the case that Sam bought any horses." « s,<e,t» ) 
ii. # "There were some horses such that Sam did not buy them." 
Chierchia ( 1 998) has presented a number of objections to a property interpretation 
of English bare plural arguments. According to Chierchia, "an approach along these 
lines leaves us completely in the dark as to why in languages like English we fmd 
bare plurals and bare mass nouns but not bare singular count nouns [Chierchia 
( 1 998): 366] ." Moreover, it gives no way of treating reflexive kind anaphora, and it 
does not give a way of treating the scopelessness of the English bare plural. 
This paper has two goals. The first goal is to answer the above objections 
and to point out problems in the generalized kinds theory of bare nominals as 
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presented in Chierchia ( 1 998).  The second goal is to show that a property-based 
analysis of the English bare plural in existential contexts can be extended towards a 
unifonn account of a wide range of narrow scope phenomena. This is something 
that a kind-based account does not allow for. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I briefly summarize what it 
buys semanticists to allow property arguments. Section 3 gives a short review of 
the basic ideas of a kind-based theory of bare nominals and answers the criticisms 
of a property-based account as raised in Chierchia ( 1 998) .  In section 4, I show that 
a property analysis provides a unifonn account of (inherent) narrow scope. Section 
. 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Property arguments 
Since Williams ( 1 983) and Partee ( 1 987) it has been widely agreed that property­
denoting NPs (type <s,<e , t» ) occur in predicative positions .  Thus, the NP a 
student in (9) and a/ool in ( 1 0) each denote a property. 
(9) John is a student. 
( 10) John considers Bill a /ool. 
Zimmermann ( 1993) argued that property-denoting NPs can also occur in argument 
positions in order to account for the opaque interpretation of indefInite complements 
of verbs like look/or. 
( 1 1 )  Sam was looking for a unicorn. 
i .  "Sam was looking for any unicorn" 
ii. "There was a unicorn such that Sam was looking for it." 
« s ,<e,t» ) 
In Van Geenhoven ( 1998), I argued that allowing verbs to combine with property 
arguments could account for non specificity in general. This leads to the view that 
verbs like buy can combine with a property-denoting argument or with an 
individual-denoting or quantifier-denoting argument. This is illustrated in ( 1 2) and 
( 1 3) .  If a verb takes a property-denoting argument, like in ( 1 2) ,  I call this semantic 
incorporation. 1 
( 12) '<Ix '<IP '<Iw 0 (buyw(x,P) --7 3y [acquirew(x,y) /\ Pw(y))) 
( 1 3) '<Ix '<Iy '<Iw.. 0 (buy..w(x,y) --7 acquirew(x,y) ) 
The idea that a verb can contribute the existential interpretation of one of its 
arguments is borrowed from Carlson ( 1 977) . The major advantage of this idea is 
that it provides a straightforward account for narrow scope: Every operator which 
takes a semantically incorporating verb in its scope will automatically take its 
existentially bound argument into its scope as well. The narrow scope reading of a 
horse in (7) , repeated here as ( 1 4) ,  follows from the assumption that on its 
nonspecific interpretation a singular indefinite denotes a property. 2 
( 14) Sam didn 't  buy a horse. 
i .  "It i s  not the case that Sam bought a horse. ',' 
ii. "There was a horse such that Sam did not buy it." 
« s ,<e,t» ) 
Moreover, if in existential contexts a nominal expression is inherently property­
denoting, its inherent narrow scope is predicted as well. Assuming that the English 
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bare plural is such a case, I account for the inherent narrowness of the bare plural, 
as illustrated in (8) and repeated here as ( 1 5) ,  by concluding that in this episodic 
context the bare plural horses can only be an argument of a semantically 
incorporating verb. 
( 1 5) Sam didn 't  buy horses. 
i .  "It is not the case that Sam bought any horses."  « s,<e,t» ) 
ii. # "There were some horses such that Sam did not buy them." 
3.  Kind arguments 
Chierchia ( 1 998) proposes that in general bare nominals only appear in verbal 
argument positions if they denote a kind. In the lexicon, mass nouns denote kinds .  
So they can appear as arguments without any problem (e.g.  milk in There was milk 
in the fridge) . In contrast, singular count nouns are predicates of singUlarities, and 
plural count nouns are predicates of pluralities .  This is illustrated for dog and dogs 
in ( 1 6a) and ( 1 6b) assuming that Joeri, Reba, and Dimmi are all the dogs in the 
world. 3 
( 1 6) a .  [ dogCN_sg ] = [joeri reba dimmi] 
b [ d ] = [ {joeri, reba } { reba, dimmi } {joeri, dimmi } ] . ogCN-pl {joeri, reba, dimmi } 
In Chierchia' s account, the cap operator n turns the predicate expressed by a plural 
count noun into a kind-denoting argument. In this way, bare plurals can be the 
argument of individual-level predicates.  This illustrated for dogs in ( 17a) in ( 17b) . 
( 1 7) a .  Dogs are intelligent. 
b .  intelligent(ndogs) 
To account for the existential interpretation of English bare plurals, as dogs in ( 1 8) ,  
an existential quantifier comes in on demand. For this purpose, Chierchia defines 
the mechanism of so-called Derived Kind Predication (DKP) which enables kind­
denoting expressions to combine with object-level predicates. 
( 1 8) Dogs are ruining my garden. 
( 1 9) DERIVED KIND PREDICATION (DKP) 
If P applies to objects and k denotes a kind, then P(k) == 3x[Uk(x) /\ P(x)] 
In DKP, the cup operator U derives properties from kinds .  This is illustrated for 
dogs in ( 1 8) in (20) . 
(20) Dogs are ruining my garden � ruining-my-garden(ndogs) 
== 3x[undogs(x) /\ ruining-my-garden(x) ] 
Note that in this neo-Carlsonian account, the inherent narrow scope of the bare 
plural in ( 1 5) is derived from the fact that a bare plural denotes a kind whose 
existential interpretation is contributed by an external source, namely DKP.  
Whenever this external source i s  in the scope of  some operator, the existentially 
223 
224 Veerle Van Geenhoven 
bound instance of the kind denoted by a bare plural will be in the scope of that 
operator as well. 
It is assumed that n , the operator which turns a property into its 
corresponding kind, does not apply to properties that hold of singularities. This 
then explains why English bare count singulars are out and why (2 1 )  i s  
ungrammatical. 
(2 1 )  * Dog walked. 
The ungrammaticality of (2 1 )  brings us to the first objection Chierchia raised for a 
property -based approach. 4 
3 . 1 .  Are English bare singulars a problem for a property analysis? 
According to Chierchia, if a verb can combine with a property argument this  
incorrectly predicts that English has bare count singulars since bare count singulars 
denote properties. Hence, (2 1 )  should be grammatical. My reply in short will be 
that it is not a task for a combinatoric mechanism like semantic incorporation to 
explain why in English bare singular count phrases are out. First, I want to point 
out two problems for a neo-Carlsonian account of the ungrammaticality of (21 ) .  
Chierchia' s account i s  based upon two assumptions. One assumption i s  that 
singular count nouns are predicates of singular entities , and the other that plural 
count nouns are predicates of plural entities. This was shown for dog and dogs in 
( l 6a) and ( 1 6b) . However, both assumptions are problematic. First, the claim that 
bare lexical stems are predicates of singularities cannot hold crosslinguistically. 
This is shown by the Inuit example in (22) , in which we have the incorporated bare 
stem for "dog". This bare stem, qimmi-, can very well be understood as a predicate 
of either a singular or a plural entity, namely as "a dog" or as "sm dogs". 
(22) Angut qimmi-qar-p-u-q. 
man.ABS .SG dog-have-IND-[-tr]-3SG 
"The man has a dog! sm dogs." 
(Inuit) 
Also English compounding provides evidence for the claim that the singular/plural 
distinction cannot be regarded as a distinctive feature of the bare lexical stem of a 
count noun. Consider for example dog food in (23) .  
(23) dog food : 
"food for one or more dogs" 
The paraphrase under (23) shows that dog in dog food receives a count 
interpretation. The paraphrase makes also clear that it is underdetermined whether 
dog is a predicate which holds of a singular dog or of a plurality of dogs. 
The second problem is this: The claim that bare plurals are predicates of 
pluralities is wrong for English. If it were true that bare plurals can only be 
predicates of pluralities one would expect that B' s answer in the dialogue in (24) is 
felicitous if B has only one dog. Ho�ever it is not.s 
(24) A : Do you have dogs? B (who has one dog) : # No, I don ' t. 
This leads me to conclude that the reason why English lacks bare count singulars 
cannot be that n applies to dogs but not to dog since (22) , (23) ,  and (24) seem to 
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indicate that the common noun dog and the bare plural phrase dogs have the same 
meaning. That is, they denote properties that hold of singularities and of pluralities .  
This is illustrated in (25) and (26) . [ joeri reba dimmi 1 
(25) [ dogCN ] = {joeri, reba } { reba, dimmi } {joeri, dimmi } 
{joeri, reba, dimmi } [ joeri reba dimmi 1 
(26) [ [dog-s] CNP ] = {joeri, reba } { reba, dimmi } {joeri , dimmi } 
{joeri, reba, dimmi } 
Turning back to Chierchia ' s  objection that a property-based approach does not 
account for why English lacks bare count singulars, it seems to me that we should 
not look for any deep semantic explanation of this fact. Indeed, it can be shown that 
the ungrammaticality of bare count singular NPs is an idiosyncratic property of 
English (and maybe of other languages as well) . This is illustrated by the Inuit 
example (27) which contains the bare count singular qimmeq. Qimmeq means "a 
dog" or "the dog" and is perfectly grammatical. 
(27) Juuna-p qirnme-q tuqut-p-a-a.6 
J.-ERG dog-SG.ABS kill-IND-[+tr]-3SG3SG 
"John killed althe dog." 
Thus I will assume that in English there is some syntactic constraint that disallows 
to project count nouns onto bare singular phrases. 
3 .2.  Is reflexive kind anaphora a problem/or a property analysis? 
The second objection that Chierchia ( 1 998) raises to a property-based account of the 
English bare plural is that it cannot account for reflexive kind anaphora in an 
adequate way. If a verbal predicate is responsible for introducing the existential 
interpretation of the bare plural, as I am assuming and as Carlson ( 1 977) assumed, 
then we cannot account for the ambiguity of (28). 
(28) Dogs were biting themselves. 
i .  "Each dog was biting itself." 
ii. "Dogs were biting dogs." 
(object-oriented) 
(kind-oriented) 
In Chierchia ' s  kind-based account, the ambiguity of (28) is treated in terms of 
whether DKP applies before or after A-application. This is illustrated in (28') . 
(28 ' )  i .  dogs were biting themselves 
� Axo[bite(xo,xo) ] (ndogs) 
== ::lxo [undogs(x) /\ bite(xo ,xo) ] 
11. dogs were biting themselves 
� AXk[bite(xk,Xk) ] (ndogs) 
== bite(ndogs ,ndogs) 
== ::lxo::lyo [undogs(xo) /\ undogs(yo) /\ bite(xo,yo) ] 
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However, this procedural explanation has a problem. We saw before in ( 1 9) that 
DKP is defmited as a rule which applies if there is a particular type mismatch when 
a verb combines with its arguments .  In (28 'i) , there is a clear type mismatch: bite is 
interpreted as a relation between object individuals and the bare plural subject dogs 
delivers a kind. However, in (28'ii) , there is no type mismatch after the arguments 
have been saturated since like in (28'i) the reflexive pronoun themselves determines 
the sort of both arguments of bite , namely, they are sorted as variables of kind 
individuals Xk. So why should DKP apply? What DKP is apparently allowed to do 
in (28 'ii) is to reset the sort of an already saturated argument, a resetting for which 
no other reason exists than that in the end bite is understood as a relation between 
two objects . But if bite must be understood that way, why can themselves 
determine the sort of  the arguments of bite as  kinds to begin with? In the remainder 
of this section, I sketch a property-based account of the ambiguity of (28) in which 
bite is unambiguously interpreted as a relation between objects and no sortal 
resetting is required. 
(29) gives the two translations of the reflexive pronoun themselves. On its 
interpretation as an object anaphor, themselves identifies the object denoted by the 
internal argument of a standard transitive verb with the object denoted by the 
external argument of this verb. This is captured in (29i) . On its kind interpretation, 
themselves identifies the kind to which the internal argument of a semantically 
incorporating verb belongs, with the kind to which this verb ' s  external argument 
belongs .  This is captured in (29ii) . 
(29) i .  themselves � AR 'Aw 'Ax 3 y  [R(x,y) /\ y = x] 
where R is a variable of type <s,<e,<e,t» > 
ii. themselves � 'Am 'Aw 'Ax 3P [m(p)(x) /\ np = nQx] 
where m is a variable of type « s,<e,t» ,<s,<e,t» > and 
nQx is a pronominal variable which stands for the kind nQ to which x belongs 
Note that unlike in (28i) and (28ii) , where in both cases the anaphoric internal 
argument themselves determines the sort of both verbal arguments, that is ,  as object 
individuals Xo or as kind individuals Xh I separate the resolution of the anaphoric 
internal argument themselves from the determination of the sort of the verb ' s  
arguments. 
(30i) gives the standard translation of bite as a relation between two 
individuals, and (30ii) gives the semantically incorporating version of the relation 
expressed by bite .  (3 1 )  gives the translation of the subject dogs as a property of 
being one or mote dogs.  -. 
(30) i .  bite � 'Aw 'Ay 'Ax [bitew(x,y)] 
ii. bite � 'AP 'Aw 'Ax 3y [bitew(x,y) /\ Pw(y)] 
(3 1 )  dogs � 'Aw 'Ay [dogsw(Y)] 
To derive the object-oriented reading of (28) ,  themselves in (29i) is fIrst combined 
with bite in (30i) yielding (32) . 
(32) were biting themselves 
� 'AR 'Aw 'Ax 3y [R(x,y) /\ y = x] ('Aw 'Ay 'Ax [bitew(x,y)] )  
= 'Aw 'Ax 3y [bitew(x,y) /\ y = x] 
= 'Aw 'Ax [bitew(x,x) ] 
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As a next step , shown in (33) ,  the VP were biting themselves is lifted to a 
semantically incorporating expression so that this VP can combine with the 
property-denoting subject dogs, as illustrated in (34) :  
(33) were biting themselves � AP AW 3x [bitew(x,x) 1\ Pw(x)] 
(34) dogs were biting themselves 
� AP AW 3x [bitew(x,x) 1\ Pw(x)] (AW Ay [dogsw(y)])  
- AW 3x  [bitew(x,x) 1\ dogsw(x)] 
To derive the kind-oriented reading of (28), themselves in (29ii) is first combined 
with bite as the semantically incorporating verb shown in (30ii) . This then gives us 
(35) .  
(35) were biting themselves 
� Am AW AX 3P [m(p)(x) 1\ np = nQx] (AP AW AX 3y [bitew(x,y) 1\ P(y)]) 
- AW AX 3P 3y [bitew(X,Y) 1\ P(y) 1\ rip = nQx] 
In a next step, shown in (36) , the VP were biting themselves is lifted to a 
semantically incorporating expression so that this VP can combine with the 
property-denoting subject dogs. This is shown in (37) , which represents the last 
step in the derivation of the kind-oriented reading of (28).  
(36) were biting themselves 
� AQ AW 3x 3P 3y [bitew(x,y) 1\ P(y) 1\ rip = rlQx 1\ Q(x)] 
(37) dogs were biting themselves 
� AQ AW 3x 3P 3y  [bitew(x,y) 1\ Pw(Y) 1\ rip = nQx 1\ Qw(x)] 
(AW Ay [dogsw(Y)]) 
- AW 3x  3P 3y [bitew(x,y) 1\ Pw(Y) 1\ np = nQx 1\ dogsw(x) ] 
- AW 3x  3P 3y [bitew(x,y) 1\ Pw(Y) 1\ rip = rldogsX 1\ dogsw(x) ] 
- AW 3x  3y [bitew(x,y) 1\ dogsw(Y) 1\ dogsw(x)] 
In the third line of (37), we see that the kind anaphora resolution instruction still 
needs to be carried out. For this purpose, I assume that the cap operator rI creates 
out of every property that holds both of singularities and of pluralities its 
corresponding kind'? This kind then serves as the antecedent of themselves, as 
illustrated in the previous tast line of (37) . Note that unlike a kind-based account we 
do not need an extra rule of existential interpretation to arrive at the correct 
representation of the kind-oriented reading of (28) nor must we manipulate the sort 
of the verb ' s  arguments. 
3.3 . Is the bare plural's scopelessness a problem for a property analysis? 
The third and last objection Chierchia ( 1 998) raises to a property-based analysis of 
the English bare plural is that it cannot explain the scopelessness of the latter. As I 
said before , in order to account for the narrow scope readings of the singular 
indefinite a horse in (38) and of the bare plural horses in (39) I propose that on 
these readings they both denote a property. Unlike the singular indefinite, the bare 
plural receives only a narrow interpretation since in existential contexts it is 
unambiguously property-denoting. 
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(38) Sam didn ' t buy a horse. 
i .  "It is not the case that Sam bought any horse." 
ii. "There was a horse such that Sam did not buy it. " 
(39) Sam didn 't  buy horses .  
« s ,<e,t» ) 
i .  "It i s  not the case that Sam bought any horses." « s,<e,t» )  
ii. # "There were some horses such that Sam did not buy them." 
However, if we derive the narrow scope of singular indefmites and bare plurals in 
one and the same way, it seems that we predict that like bare plurals singular 
indefinites can take narrow scope with respect to for-adverbials. (40) seems to 
show that this is an incorrect prediction. The sentence Bill discovered a flea on his 
dog for an hour can only have the crazy reading that the same flea was discovered 
again and again throughout the hour. (41 )  instead does not have such a crazy 
reading. 
(40) ? Bill discovered a flea on his dog for an hour. 
(41 )  Bill discovered fleas on his dog for an hour. 
First of all, it has been debated in the literature whether the contrast between (40) 
and (41 )  must be accounted for in terms of scope. The major disadvantage of a 
scope account is that it must stipulate that singular indefinites take wide scope with 
respect to a far-adverbial. For this reason, nonscope accounts have been given as 
for instance in Krifk:a ( 1 989) and Zucchi and White ( 1 996) . According to Krifk:a, 
for-adverbials come with a condition on the event predicate they combine with, 
namely, they require that the event predicate they combine with be atelic or 
nonquantized. In the remainder of this section, I sketch an alternative and property­
based condition-on-the-event-predicate approach in which iterativity plays a crucial 
role. 8  
First, in Van Geenhoven (2000) I point out that transitive verbs give rise to 
what I call "iterative weak" and "iterative strong" readings .  For example, if a 
transitive verb like dial has an indefinite complement, as in (42) , the only available 
reading is the iterative strong reading, that is ,  the reading in which a particular 
number is dialed again and again. If the same transitive verb dial takes a bare plural 
complement, as in (43),  the only available reading is the iterative weak reading, that 
is, the reading in which Sam dials and dials wrong numbers again and again. 
( 42) Sam dialed a wron,g number for an hour. 
i .  # "Sam dialed a wrong number again and again for an hour." # iter. weak 
ii. "There was a wrong number and Sam dialed it again and again for an 
hour." iterative strong 
(43) Sam dialed wrong numbers for an hour. 
i .  "Sam dialed one or more wrong numbers again and again 
for an hour." iterative weak 
ii. # "There were some wrong numbers and Sam dialed them again and 
again for an hour." # iterative strong 
Second, with this observation in mind I suggest that one must explain the oddness 
of (40) , repeated below as (44) , by comparing it with (42) , that is, one must 
answer the question of why the interaction of an indefinite with a for-adverbial 
sounds odd in (44) but not in (42) . One must ask that question rather than the 
question that has been asked so far, namely, the question of why the interaction of 
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an indefinite with afar-adverbial sometimes sounds odd whereas the interaction of 
a bare plural with afar-adverbial never sounds odd, as illustrated by (43) and (45). 
(44) ? Bill discovered a flea on his dog for an hour. 
i .  # "Bill discovered a flea again and again for an hour." # iterative weak 
ii. ? "There was a flea and Bill discovered it again and again for an hour." 
? iterative strong 
(45) Bill discovered fleas on his dog for an hour. 
i .  "Bill discovered one or more fleas again and again for an hour." it. weak 
ii. # "There were some fleas and Bill discovered them again and again for 
an hour." # iterative strong 
Third, the idea upon which my alternative condition-on-the-event-predicate 
approach relies, is that a for-adverbial simply describes the duration of the event 
time of the event predicate with which it combines.  This is for instance the case 
with the predicate torture a rabbit in Bill tortured a rabbit for an hour or watch a 
humming-bird in Tom watched a humming-bird for a while. If the described event 
cannot last the duration expressed by a far-adverbial, the event predicate itself is 
understood in an iterative way. This iterative interpretation can be triggered by an 
overt iterative expression like every day in Bill discovered a flea on his dog every 
day for a month. But iterativity can also be implicitly present in the interpretation of 
the verb. For instance dial a number for an hour almost automatically means to dial 
a number again and again for an hour since dialing a number normally never takes 
an hour. For the purpose of this paper I cannot explain in detail how exactly 
iterativity is expressed in the verb. But the following examples of silent iterativity in 
the verbs dial and discover should make the idea a bit more concrete.9 
To get the iterative weak interpretation of (43),  the verb dial is translated as 
the property-taking and implicitly iterative verb (46) . 
(46) dial :::::> AP At AX 3y (AGAIN dial*(x,y) at t 1\ P(y)) 
where 
AGAIN dial*(x,y) at t = 1 iff 
Vt' (t' c t � AGAIN 3y ' (y '  c y 1\ dial(x,y ' )  at t ' )) 
where 
AGAIN 3y ' (y'  c y 1\ dial(x,y ' )  at t ' )  = 1 iff 3y ' (y '  C y 1\ dial(x,y ' )  at t ' )  = I 
and AGAIN 3y ' (y ' C y 1\ dial(x,y' )  at t') is defined 
AGAIN 3y ' (y '  C y 1\ dial(x,y ' )  at t ')  is defmed iff 
3t"(MAX(At 3y"'(y ' C Y 1\ dial(x,y ' )  at t))(t") 1\ t" < t' and 
3t" ' (t" < t'" < t '  1\ -, 3y"(y"c y 1\ dial(x,y") at t" ' ))) 
where 
MAX(At 3y ' (y '  C y 1\ dial(x,y) at t))(t") = 1 iff 
3y ' (y '  c y 1\ dial(x,y ' )  at t") = 1 and -,3t(dial(x,y ' )  at t 1\ t"c t) 
The star operator on "AGAIN dial" does the same distributing job as Link' s ( 1 983) 
star operator on nominal predicates in that it distributes events of a particular kind 
and also the events ' participants over event times. The AGAIN operator brings along 
two meaning components . The first component is that when applied to an event 
description, it states that an event of the same kind has taken place before. Hence, 
(46) says that for each event time at which a dialing takes place there is a maximal 
preceding dialing time. The second meaning contribution of AGAIN is that between 
two events of the same kind an interval must exist at which no event of the same 
kind takes place. (46) therefore says that there must be a hiatus between two 
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dialings. 1 0  Adopting (46) as the translation of dial in the iterative weak reading of 
(43) ,  as shown in (43 '), we see that the property denoted by the bare plural wrong 
numbers is distributed over dialing times. Note in this respect that I regard the bare 
plural as denoting a property that can hold of singularities and of pluralities (see 
(26)).  This makes wrong numbers a temporally distributable property. 
( 43 ' )  Sam dialed wrong numbers for an hour 
� 3t  [l-hour(t) /\ 3y(AGAIN dial*(s,y) at t /\ wrong-numbers(y)) 
- 3t  [l-hour(t) /\ 3y(wrong-numbers(y) /\ Vt ' (t '  c t � 3t"3y '  (y ' c y /\ 
dial(s,y ' )  at t' /\ MAX (At 3y'  (y ' c Y /\ dial(s,y ' )  at t /\ 
wrong-numbers(y") at t))(t") /\ t" < t' /\ 3t"(t" < t'" < t' /\ 
-,3y"(y" c y /\ dial(s ,y") at t" ' ))))] 
'" 
Unlike (43) , (42) lacks an iterative weak interpretation since the singular indefmite a 
wrong number cannot be semantically incorporated by the verb dial in (46) . A 
wrong number denotes a property that only holds of singularities and as such it 
does not provide a temporally distributable property. 
Similarly, to get the iterative weak interpretation of (45) as in (45') ,  the verb 
discover is translated as the property-taking and implicitly iterative verb (47) . 
(47) discover � AP At AX 3y (AGAIN discover* (x,y) at t /\ P(y)) 
(45 ') Bill discovered fleas (on his dog) for an hour 
� 3t  [l-hour(t) /\ 3y(AGAIN discover*(b,y) at t /\ fleas(y)) 
- 3t  [l-hour(t) /\ 3y(fleas(y) /\ Vt' (t' c t � 3t"3y '  (y ' c y /\ 
discover(b,y ' )  at t' /\ MAX(At 3y' (y ' c Y /\ discover(b,y ' )  at t /\ 
fleas(y") at t))(t") /\ t" < t ' /\ 3t"(t" < t'" < t' /\ -,3y"(y" c y /\ 
discover(b,y") at t" ' ))))] 
Unlike (45) , (44) lacks an iterative weak interpretation since the singular indefmite a 
flea cannot be semantically incorporated by the verb discover in (47) . The reason is 
that a flea does not provide a temporally distributable property. 
Whereas we make use of semantically incorporating verbs to account for 
iterative weak readings, I propose that to account for iterative strong readings we 
make use of nonincorporating verbs. For example, to arrive at the iterative strong 
reading of (42) the nonincorporating iterative version of dial in (48) is used. 
(48) dial � Ay At AX (AGAIN* dial(x,y) at t) 
where ·� •. 
AGAIN* dial(x,y) at t = 1 iff Vt' (t' c t � AGAIN dial(x,y) at t ' )  
where 
AGAIN dial(x,y) at t '  = 1 iff 
dial(x,y) at t' = 1 and AGAIN dial(x,y) at t' is defined 
AGAIN dial(x,y) at t' is defmed iff 3t"(MAX(At dial(x,y) at t)(t") /\ t" < t' 
and 3t" ' (t" < t' " < t '  /\ -, dial(x,y) at t' ' ' )) 
Note that unlike in the translation of the semantically incorporating verb dial in (46), 
in (48) it is the AGAIN operator itself which is starred. This captures the 
interpretation of dial as dial something again and again and again . . .  , which is the 
interpretation of dial in (42) , as shown in (42') . 1 l 
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(42 ' )  Sam dialed a wrong number for an hour 
� 3t [l-hour(t) 1\ wrong-number(y) 1\ AGAIN* dial(y,s) at t] 
= 3t [l-hour(t) 1\ wrong-number(y) 1\ Vt ' (t ' c t � 
3t"(dial(s ,y) at t' 1\ MAX(At dial(s,y) at t)(t") 1\ t" < t ' 1\ 
3t" ' (t" < t' " < t' 1\ -, dial(s ,y) at t" ' » )] 
It follows automatically that (43) lacks an iterative strong interpretation: Wrong 
numbers denotes a property and cannot combine with the nonincorporating verb in 
(48) , which contains the source of the iterative strong interpretation. 
For the odd iterative strong interpretation of (44) , the nonincorporating verb 
(49) is used. The oddness results from the fact that applying AGAIN* to discover 
does not make much sense: An object can be discovered only once. 
(49) discover � AY At AX (AGAIN* discover(x,y) at t) 
where 
AGAIN* discover(x,y) at t = 1 iff Vt' (t ' c t � AGAIN discover(x,y) at t ' )  
where 
AGAIN discover(x,y) at t' = 1 iff 
discover(x,y) at t ' = 1 and AGAIN discover(x,y) at t' is defined 
AGAIN discover(x,y) at t' is defined iff 3t"(MAX(At discover(x,y) at t)(t") 
1\ t" < t ' and 3t" ' (t" < t'" < t' 1\ -, discover(x,y) at t" ' »  
but !! 
discover(x,y) at t = 1 iff -,3t' (t' < t 1\ find(x,y) at t ' )  
Like (43),  (45) lacks an (odd) iterative strong interpretation since in existential 
contexts the bare plural fleas can only denote a property. Hence, it cannot combine 
with a nonincorporating verb like (49) . 
From this excursion into the domain of for-adverbials and silent iterativity, I 
draw two conclusions. One is that if a semantically incorporating verb is interpreted 
in an iterative way it can only apply to the property denoted by a bare plural since 
only the latter' s  denotation is distributable over event times.  The second conclusion 
is that we can stick to a uniform property-based account of the narrow scope 
readings of the indefmite in (38) and of the bare plural in (39) . 
4. Evidence for a uniform narrow scope account 
What I have shoWn sofar is that the objections Chierchia ( 1 998) raises to a property 
analysis can be answered. What I will do now is show that a property analysis 
allows for a uniform account of (inherent) narrow scope phenomena while a 
generalized kinds approach does not allow for this. For this purpose, I go through 
three points. First, the point that inherent narrow scope does not only hold of the 
English bare plural. Second, we take a look at how Dutch children interpret singular 
indefmites. And third, I discuss bare plurals like pieces from that puzzle. 
4. 1 .  Inherent narrow scope 
Chierchia argues that in English a singular indefinite and the bare plural have 
different interpretations. This leaves us with a semantic component which has two 
separate devices to account for the narrow scope readings of (38) and (39) , repeated 
once more as (50) and (5 1 ) .  
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(50) Sam didn 't  buy a horse. 
i .  "It i s  not the case that Sam bought any horse." 
ii. "There was a horse such that Sam did not buy it." 
(5 1 )  Sam didn' t  buy horses .  
« s ,<e,t» ) 
i .  "It i s  not the case that Sam bought any horses." « s ,<e,t» ) 
ii. # "There were some horses such that Sam did not buy them." 
On the one hand, we have a quantificational account for the narrow reading of the 
singular indefinite a horse in (50) and a kind-based account for the inherent narrow 
reading of the bare plural horses in (5 1 ) ,  on the other. This in itself may not be a 
, problem. However, if we adopt a neo-Carlsonian account of the inherent narrow 
scope of the English bare plural, this means that we need yet another deviCe to 
account for the inherent narrow scope of those expressions which cannot be said to 
denote kinds. As Bittner ( 1994) points out for Inuit, incorporated nouns and their 
external modifiers have only a narrow scope interpretation, as shown in (52) , an 
example borrowed from Bittner ( 1 994) .  It would be rather awkward to say that the 
elements marlunnik and allagar denote the kind "two letters". 
(52) Juuna Kaali-mit marlun-nik allagar-si-nngi-I-a-q. 
J.AB S K.-ABL two-INST.PL letter-get-NEG-IND-[-tr]-3SG 
i .  "It i s  not the case that Juuna got two letters from Kaali." 
ii. # "There were a two letters from Kaali and Juuna did not get them." 
That a numeral-noun combination cannot be said to denote a kind can be concluded 
from the fact that such combinations cannot be the subject of a kind-level 
predicate. 1 2  This is illustrated for English in (53) and (54) .  
(53)  ? Two lions (vs .  lions) are widespread. 
(54) ? Three whiskey bottles (vs. whiskey bottles) come in two sizes.  
It follows that whatever account one develops to deal with the inherent narrowness  
of cases like the Inuit one in (52) i t  cannot be a kind-based account. In a property­
based account, we have not only a uniform narrow scope account of (50) and (5 1 ) .  
If a nominal expression in existential contexts is inherently property-denoting, like 
the English bare plural in (5 1 )  is and the Inuit numeral-incorporated-noun 
combination in (52) is too, its inherent narrow scope follows automatically because 
such an expression will combine only with a semantically incorporating verb . . - -
4.2. The acquisition of Dutch indefinites 
The reading paraphrases under (55) indicate that Dutch adults interpret a scrambled 
indefmite as a wide scope expression. 
(55) De jongen heeft een vis niet gevangen. 
the boy . has a fish not caught 
i .  # "It i s  not the case that the boy caught any fish." (# -, 3) 
ii. ''There was a fish such that it is not the case that the boy caught it."(3 -,) 
Kramer (2000) has found out that more than 80% of the Dutch children (age 4;0 -
5;6) she investigated, interpret scrambled indefinites in a nonadultlike way, that is, 
as narrow scope indefinites. In Dutch child language, singular indefmites thus  
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seem to be interpreted as adult bare plurals,  that is, with a strong tendency for an 
inherent narrow scope interpretation. In a neo-Carlsonian approach, children ' s  
indefinites and bare plurals cannot be a natural class in the children ' s  grammar 
since in adult grammar they have completely separate denotations. In contrast, in a 
property-based approach, children' s  indefinites and bare plurals simply build a 
natural class .  They both denote properties.  What Dutch children apparently do at 
some stage in their acquisition of the meanings of indefinites is to overgeneralize 
their predicative interpretations. 
The extent to which this acquisitional argument has crosslinguistic force still 
needs to be investigated. For instance ,  the fact that Inuit children acquire noun 
incorporation at an early stage of their development may indicate that the predicative 
interpretation of a nominal expression is acquired early. 1 3  A more reliable answer to 
the question of whether Inuit children first acquire and therefore overgeneralize the 
predicative interpretation of indefinites could be found by investigating whether 
Inuit children interpret those structures in a narrow way too,  which typically trigger 
wide scope readings in adult Inuit. An interesting test would be to check whether 
Inuit children interpret the object NPs in transitive constructions , which are 
structures that trigger wide scope in Inuit adult language, as predicative indefinites. 
An example is given in (56). 
(56) Jaaku-p umiarsuaq taku-sima-nngi-I-a-a. [Bittner ( 1 988) :  43] 
J.-ERG ship.ABS see-PERF-NEG-IND-[+trj-3SG.3SG 
i .  # "It is not the case that Jacob saw a ship ."  (#  -, 3) 
ii. "There was a ship such that Jacob did not see it." (3 -,) 
4.3 . Pieces from that puzzle 
In this section, I tum to one type of the English bare plural which never denotes a 
kind. Examples of these NPs you fmd under (57) .  
(57) a.  parts for that machine 
b .  parts from the airplane 
c .  pieces from that puzzle 
As Carlson ( 1 977) points out, these bare plurals never denote a kind but they 
nevertheless may exhibit the same "differentiated scope" behaviour as regular bare 
plurals (see Carlson ( 1 927) : 3 1 8) . While (5 8) has only an absurd omnipresent 
reading of the indefmite a part from the airplane, the bare plurals parts from the 
airplane in (59) and airplanes in (60) have only a distributive reading. 
(58) A part from the airplane was everywhere. 
(59) Parts from the airplane were everywhere. 
(60) Airplanes were everywhere. 
Similarly, while the sentences (6 1 )  and (62) with the indefinites a piece from that 
puzzle and a book that I lost yesterday only receive a crazy iterative reading, the 
sentences (63) and (64) with the bare plurals pieces from that puzzle and books that 
I lost yesterday do not sound crazy. They are just as fine as the sentences (65) and 
(66) which contain the regular bare plurals puzzles and books. 
(6 1)  ? Max discovered a piece from that puzzle for three hours. 
(62) ? Fred repeatedly destroyed a book that I lost yesterday. 
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(63) Max discovered pieces from that puzzle for three hours. 
(64) Fred repeatedly destroyed books that I lost yesterday. 
(65) Max discovered puzzles for three hours. 
(66) Fred repeatedly destroyed books. 
Still, according to Chierchia ( 1 998) bare plurals like parts for that machine are 
indefmite NPs. For him this correctly predicts that the NP parts for that machine in 
(67) receives a narrow and a wide interpretation. 
(67) John didn't fmd parts for that machine. 
i .  "It i s  not the case that John found any parts for that machine." 
ii. "There were some parts for that machine such that John did not 
fmd them." 
However, assigning the wide scope reading to (67) is problematic for at least four 
reasons. First, what happens to Carlson' s  observations with respect to the contrast 
between (58) and (59) , and between (6 1 )-(62) and (63)-(64)? That is, if the not­
kind-denoting bare plurals in (59) , (63) , and (64) should be really interpreted as 
indefinites, why do these bare plurals not pattern with their singular indefinite 
counterparts in (58), (6 1 ) ,  and (62)? That is a piece from a puzzle which Chierchia 
does not solve. 
Second, to contrast indefinites with regular bare plurals Carlson ( 1 977) 
presents the contradictory reading test. We see that this test applies here too. While 
(68) can have a noncontradictory reading, (69) cannot. In other words, if a store 
owner tells you (69) , you may get slightly irritated after you have shown him your 
lamp. 
(68) Some light bulbs for this lamp are for sale here and some light bulbs for 
this lamp are not for sale here. 
(69) Light bulbs for this lamp are for sale here and light bulbs for this lamp 
are not for sale here. 
Still, some not-kind-denoting bare plurals seem not to give rise to this kind of 
irritation. For some speakers of English (70) is a case in point. 
(70) Parts of that machine have been found now and parts of that machine 
have not been found now. 
�, 
-. 
Does this mean that sentences like (67) have a wide scope reading after all? I believe 
not. The reason why (70) seems to escape a contradictory reading lies in the 
meaning of parts of A machine usually consists of many different parts. Suppose 
after an accident some firemen are collecting the parts of a machine that exploded, 
and they say (70) to a policeman who wants to know what is going on. In that case, 
the policemen will believe that the firemen are cooperative and do not want to fool 
him when they say (70) . The apparently specific interpretation of parts of that 
machine as some parts of that machine arises because the policemen realizes that the 
firemen have not yet found all the parts. Still, this specific reading must be a 
pragmatic effect triggered by parts of since otherwise (7 1 )  should have a reading in 
which parts of that machine is understood as an omnipresent set of parts. But there 
is no such reading for (7 1 ) .  
(7 1 )  Parts of that machine were everywhere. 
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Third, in German not-kind-denoting and regular bare plurals pattern alike in the 
sense that they both cannot scramble. This is illustrated in (72) and (73) . 
(72) * Jan hat Bimen fiir diese Lampe 
J. has bulbs for this lamp 
(73) * Jan hat Bimen nicht gefunden. 
nicht gefunden. 
not found 
As shown in (74) German indefinites can scramble. In fact, they must scramble to 
receive a specific interpretation. 
(74) Jan hat einige Birnen fiir diese Lampe nicht gefunden. 
J. has some bulbs for this lamp not found 
"There were some bulbs for this lamp such that J. did not fmd them." 
To my knowledge, German bare plurals and English bare plurals have the same 
semantic behaviour. On a Chierchian account of not-kind-denoting bare plurals it 
would be unclear why the German counterpart of light bulbs for this lamp cannot 
scramble, that is, why in (72) this NP cannot be understood as a specific indefinite. 
Finally, if not-kind-denoting bare plurals were like indefinites ,  we would 
predict that like (75) ,  (76) is well-formed. But it is not. A not-kind-denoting bare 
plural cannot be the subject of an individual-level predicate. 
(75) Some dogs are intelligent. 
(76) * Dogs in the next cage are intelligent. 
On a property approach, the narrow scope behaviour of not-kind-denoting bare 
plurals is not a surprise. They denote properties from which no natural kind can be 
created. Note that they nevertheless denote properties which hold of singularities 
and of pluralities .  As such they are temporally distributable which means that they 
can be semantically incorporated by a silently iterative verb such as discover in 
(63) .  Note in this respect that they are also distributable over space, which allows 
them to combine with the predicate be everywhere without yielding an omnipresent 
reading, as shown in (59) and (7 1 ) . 1 4  
5 .  Conclusion 
Let me summarize what • .! have accomplished here. First, I have answered the 
objections that Ghierchia raises against an account which allows for property 
arguments. In this respect, I have shown that there is no need for a deep semantic 
explanation for why English has no bare count singulars. I have also shown that 
reflexive kind anaphora can be treated in a property-based account of the English 
bare plural. And I have shown that the scopelessness of the English bare plural 
does not raise problems for a property analysis. On the contrary. I have shown that 
the successful interaction of indefinites withfor-adverbials depends on whether we 
can interpret the verb in an iterative way or not, or on whether there is an overt 
iterative adverbial or not. Finally, and more importantly ,  I have shown that a 
property analysis can account uniformly for a wide range of (inherent) narrow 
scope phenomena. However, a neo-Carlsonian account cannot. 
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Endnotes 
* For their comments and criticisms I thank Greg Carlson, Irene Heim, Wolfgang 
Klein, Louise McNally, and Sandro Zucchi. 
1 .  Following this view, Van Geenhoven and McNally (2000) understand opacity as 
a special case of nonspecificity. That is, opaque arguments are interpreted as 
modally embedded properties. This is illustrated in (i) for look/or. 
(i) Vx VP Vw 0 (look-forw(x,P) f-7 tryw(x, A.WI 3y[findwo(x,y) A pw·(y) ] ) )  
2. Following Van Geenhoven ( 1 998),  I assume that the singular indefinite is 
ambiguous between a property and a free variable interpretation. On the latter 
interpretation it receives its quantificational force through accommodation, which is 
the mechanism that takes care of the non-narrow readings of indefinites. 
3 .  I adopt Chierchia' s notation and represent characteristic functions by enclosing 
their extension in square brackets. 
4. L. McNally points out that despite the ungrammaticality of (21 )  English has a 
number of bare singulars (e.g. go by train/car, eat dinner/lunch, etc.) . 
5 . See Hinrichs ( 1 985) :  295-30 1 for the same observation. 
6. Note that -q on qimme- is not an absolutive case marker but rather a number 
marker for singularity. Absolutive case is not overtly realized in Inuit. 
7. In contrast to Chierchia, I assume that the cap operator creates kinds out of 
properties that simultaneously hold of singularities and of pluralities. I suggest that 
it is also this operator which becomes active if a bare plural occurs in a generic 
context, and which turns the bare plural ' s  basic property meaning into that of a 
kind. In this paper, I do not discuss the interpretation of bare plurals in generic 
contexts. 
8. In Van Geenhoven (2000) , I show that one of the disadvantages of Krifka' s  
approach is that iterativity i s  reduced to nonquantization. For example, the fact that 
(i) can have two readings, namely what I call a nonstop reading and what I call an 
iterative reading, is not visible in a semantic representation that is based upon the 
fact that discover fleas is nonquantized. 
(i) Bill discovered fleas on his dog for an hour. 
a. "Bill discovered fleas nonstop for an hour." nonstop 
b .  "Bill discovered fleas again and again for an hour." iterative 
The fact that the iterative one is the more natural reading of (i) is simply ignored and 
reduced to the fact that discover fleas is nonquantized. 
9. The idea that if no overt iterative expression is present, iterativity must be 
expressed on the verb could also be captured by saying that the verb must express 
pluractionality (see Lasersohn ( 1995)). 
10. Unlike Lasersohn (1 995) ,  I do not start out with a basic meaning of 
pluractionality to which then clauses are added that deal with the different readings 
of pluractionality (see Lasersohn' s  "continuous" and "separated" readings). The 
way in which these different readings come about in my approach depends on 
whether the verb is semantically incorporating or not, on whether the * and AGAIN 
operator are both present or not, and on how the verb, * ,  and AGAIN interact with 
each other. 
1 1 .  Note that in (421) the variable y introduced by the indefinite a wrong number is 
free. We need an additional interpretive mechanism to bind this variable (see 
Abusch ( 1994) ,  Van Geenhoven ( 1998)) .  
12 .  G. Carlson points out to me that unlike the numeral-noun combinations some 
numeral NPs seem to be fine as the subject of a kind-level predicate. His examples 
are the following: 
(i) Pairs of lions (vs. two lions) are very common. 
(ii) Octuplets (vs. eight siblings born at the same time) are usually dressed alike. 
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According to him these data seem to undercut the initial implausibility of my claim 
that numeral-noun combinations cannot denote a kind. 
1 3 .  See Fortescue and Lennert Olsen ( 1 992) for the early acquisition of noun 
incorporation in West Greenlandic Inuit, and Allen ( 1996) for the early acquisition 
of noun incorporation in Inuktitut, a variety of Inuit spoken in Canada. 
1 4. To account for the fact that a singular indefinite gives rise only to an odd and 
omnipresent reading I suggest that the predicate be everywhere is "pluractional" in 
the sense that it combines only with complements that denote spatially distributable 
properties. 
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